从不久前美国总统奥巴马把亚太经合组织峰会的主角拱手让给中国国家主席，到媒体对刚闭幕的中共十八大三中全会的铺天盖地的政治解读，中国这个崛起中的东方巨人正在强势渗透西方的政治话语。不幸的是，西方关于中国的种种话语却产生于一个完全错位的范式。
自1989年以来，西方世界关于中国的主流观点可大致归纳为两种理论流派，它们的终极目标是一致的，都是建立一个必须包含中国在内的普世性世界秩序，然而却推崇截然相反的对华政策导向。第一个流派是预测中国将全盘崩溃的“崩溃临近派”，其中坚力量是“冷战勇士”们。他们认为，在中国由贫穷的农耕国家向工业化、城市化国家充满阵痛的转型过程中，一党领导的政治体制根本无法管理剧烈的社会和经济冲突。建立在这一理论基础上，他们主张西方联盟遏制中国，加速这个他们视为由非法性政权统治的威胁性大国的崩塌。另一个流派是由“拥抱熊猫”的普世主义者组成的“和平演变派”。他们预测“中国终将变得和我们一样”，认为在现代化进程中，中国经济将不可避免地接受资本主义，中国政治体制将不可避免地走向选举民主。他们主张西方应增加与中国的接触，以催化这一演变。
在这两种思想流派指引下，西方知识界和决策层经历着可谓是当代世界上意义最重大的变局，暨中国的重返世界强国之列。将近四分之一个世纪过去了，他们交出的成绩单并不理想。
崩溃临近派的基本假设包括：中共死守着苏俄版的僵化共产主义意识形态，实行着独裁统治；中国的政治体制从根本上缺乏适应中国社会高速现代化的能力；大量的社会和经济冲突将很快爆发，这个政党国家最终必将遭遇与苏联亡党亡国同样的命运；中国崩溃之时，便是西方扫除最后一块意识形态绊脚石，彻底实现普世秩序之日。
中国的现代化进程不但没有削弱，反而强化了中国共产党的领导
然而，数十年来，冷战勇士们不得不反复修改预言，一次次推延中国崩溃的日期。他们到底错在哪里？事实是，中国共产党不但没有压抑或抵抗现代化，反而是中国现代化的主导力量。通常被政治学者和评论家们视为专属于民主体制的自我纠错能力，竟成了中共治国的特色。在共产党治理中国这个世界规模最大、变化最快的国家的数十年中，其政策调整范围之广、改进力度之大，现代历史上无出其右者。中共最近取得的成就，是引领中国完成了由中央计划型经济向市场经济的复杂转型，而很多其他发展中国家却在此失败了。在中共的领导下，中国人民的生活水平取得了巨大提升，其规模之大，速度之快，人类历史上前所未有。
正因为中共取得了这样的执政业绩，所以中国的现代化进程不但没有削弱，反而强化了党的领导。中共获得成功的关键在于其体制的内在因素。数十年来，中共已发展出一套训练、考验、选拔国家领导人的机制。当今世界无数国家实施了被包装成灵丹妙药的民主选举，而国家却停滞不前。中国通过选贤任能的选拔机制所取得的成就让它们望尘莫及。
不仅主张“中国崩溃论”的预言家们陷入了尴尬境地，那些普世主义者心中更是五味杂陈，因为中国并未如他们言之凿凿地预测过那样，向自由民主和市场资本主义演变。这派人的坚定信念，建立在后冷战时代的宏大叙事指引下：苏联崩溃以后，世界将在统一的全球秩序下趋同，西方的价值将成为普世价值；西方的标准将成为普世标准。确实，许多国家在这一宏大叙事前屈服了，在全球化的逼迫下，它们走上了充满艰难甚至暴力的政治和经济体制转型的道路。
然而，中国却选择了另一条路。在中国共产党大刀阔斧地开启改革时，中国已具有高度的民族独立和政治自主权，而这种独立性是许多发展中国家所无法企及的。中国牢牢地掌握着自己的命运，以自己的方式加入全球化大潮。一党领导制在中国不但依旧稳如磐石，而且中共的体制更加成熟，实力更加雄厚了。中共在与发达国家的经济整合过程中在最大程度上为本国人民谋取利益。外国公司只有在对华直接投资和技术转让的条件下才能获得中国市场的准入权，为中国工业创造了就业机会、带来了高新科技。中共在市场力量之上行使政治职权，在基础设施、医疗保健和教育等领域进行了有史以来最大规模的投入。
对和平演变派来说，“他们终将变得和我们一样”的美梦已经化作了泡影。在冷战结束后，世界上许多国家受到西方物质成功的迷惑，一味模仿西方的政治经济体制，置本国本民族文化根基和历史环境于不顾。如今，除了极少数个例之外，绝大多数引入选举政治和资本主义的发展中国家都仍在贫穷和内乱中挣扎。就连发达国家，政治傲慢和过度扩张也使得它们陷入了政治瘫痪、经济停滞的厄运。铁一般的事实是：从华盛顿到开罗，民主政治正面临四面楚歌。如今，就连最天真的“拥抱熊猫者”也无法继续幻想中国会跟着上当。
如果西方希望与中国理性地交往，就必须转换陈腐的思想范式。或许这样的转变将为西方与世界的接触提供新观念，甚至能帮助西方思考和解决自身的重重困境。
西方如欲重新审视它们的中国观，最好能先理解中国不是什么。中国既不是一个革命型国家，也不是扩张性国家。之所以说中国不是革命型国家，是因为中国与近代西方不同，在国际舞台上不是一个受意识形态主导的行为体，对价值观或执政理念的输出不感兴趣。即使其利益早已扩张至全世界(请勿误读，中国必定会全力捍卫其海外利益)，中国也不会主动试图改变其它国家的内部动态。之所以说中国不是扩张性国家，是因为中华文明没有对外扩张的基因。与人类历史上众多的帝国相比，源远流长的中华文明即使在鼎盛时期也很少大规模对外侵略。中国人的世界观是向心的，而非普世的。在现实中，中国相当清醒地认识到，由于自身规模庞大，即使不能完全接受当前的全球结构，也必须以和平的方式崛起，否则后果不堪设想。从自身利益出发，克制和谨慎将是中国实现民族复兴过程中的座右铭。
历史上，由于现行国际结构未能与新兴崛起的大国有效地协调和博弈而发生冲突的悲剧无可胜数。但中国的崛起有可能走出这一宿命。给中国一点时间和空间，继续走适合这个古老民族的道路，世界可拭目以待。己所不欲勿施于人。一味强迫世界按照西方设计的方案走向收敛归一的趋同，已经让包括西方在内的所有人付出了巨大的代价。如果我们调整心态，尊重世界的多元，或许将为更加和谐、更可持续的趋同做下良好的铺垫。李世默是上海的风险投资家、政治学学者、春秋研究院研究员，本文为作者近日在英国牛津大学辩论社演讲内容。英文及中文全文刊发在《耶鲁全球》杂志及同名网站。
A TALE OF TWO SCHOOLS
Where the West Got Wrong on China
From President Barack Obama’s ceding of the center stage to his Chinese counterpart at the recent APEC gathering to frenzied attempts to decipher the country’s political and economic directions from the party’s just finished Third Plenum, the rising giant of the East often dominates Western political discourse. Unfortunately, such discourses are taking place on a faulty paradigm。
Ever since 1989, mainstream Western opinions about China have been dominated by two divergent theories with opposite policy prescriptions. The ultimate aim of both was to build a universalized world order, which, of course, could not be credible without China. One is the “imminent collapse” school. Espoused by cold warriors, it predicted wholesale collapse of the country. The one-party political system was inherently incapable of managing the intensifying social and economic conflicts as the country went through its wrenching transformation from a poor agrarian economy to an industrialized and urban one. The Western alliance should seek to contain China, so the theory went, and thereby hasten the fall of a threatening power ruled by an illegitimate regime. The other is the “peaceful evolution” school. These are the panda-hugging universalists who made the “they-will-become-just-like-us” prediction. As the country modernized its economy, China would inevitably accept market capitalism and democratize its political system, and proponents urged deploying an engagement policy to speed up this evolution。
Nearly a quarter century has passed since the Western intellectual and policy establishment has been guided by these two schools of thought about arguably the most significant development of our time – China’s reemergence as a great power. The report card is not pretty。
The assumptions made by the imminent-collapse school include the following: China was run by a dictatorial party clinging to the dead ideology of Soviet communism. Its political system inherently lacked the ability to adapt to the rapidly modernizing Chinese society. The myriad social and economic conflicts would soon implode, and the fate of the Soviet Union awaited the party state. With that, a major ideological obstacle to a Western-designed universal order would be removed。
Of course, the cold warriors have had to postpone the effective date of their prediction year after year for decades. What did they get wrong? It turned out that the party has not been holding back or reacting to China’s modernization, but leading it. Self-correction, an ability many attribute to democracies, has been a hallmark of the party’s governance. In its many decades of governing the largest and fastest changing country in the world the party has pursued the widest range of policy changes compared with any other nation in modern history. Most recently it has successfully managed a highly complex transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy – where many developing nations have failed. In the process it has produced the most significant improvement in standard of living for the largest number of people in the shortest time in history。
Because of this performance record, China’s modernization process has strengthened the party’s rule, not weakened it. The key driver of the party’s success is inherent in its political institution. Over the decades, the party has developed a process through which capable leaders are trained and tested – eventually emerging at the top to lead the country. Whereas elections have failed to deliver in many parts of the world, meritocratic selection has in China。
As embarrassing as it must have been for the collapse predictors, the bitterest disappointment belongs to the universalists who foresaw with philosophical certitude the inevitable evolution of China towards liberal democracy and market capitalism. Their conviction was guided by the grand post–Cold War narrative: After the fall of the Soviet Union, the world would come together under a globalized order. Western values were universal values. Western standards were universal standards. Indeed, many have capitulated to that narrative. A large number of developing countries transformed their political and economic systems, some violently, to meet the demands of globalization。
But China walked a different path. As the party embarked on dramatic reforms, the country possessed a degree of national independence unmatched by most developing nations. This ability to control its own destiny allowed China to engage globalization on its own terms. Its one-party system remained intact and the party institution matured and strengthened. Its economic integration with the developed world was carried out in ways that brought maximum benefits to the Chinese people. Market access was granted in exchange for direct investments that created industrial jobs and technology transfers. The government exercised political authority above market forces and led the largest investment expansion in infrastructure and health and education in history。
The dream of “they-will-become-just-like-us” has evaporated. After the Cold War, many were enamored by the material successes of the West and sought to emulate Western political and economic systems without regards to their own cultural roots and historical circumstances. Now, with a few exceptions, the vast majority of developing countries that have adopted electoral regimes and market capitalism remain mired in poverty and civil strife. In the developed world, political paralysis and economic stagnation reign. The hard fact is this: Democracy is failing from Washington to Cairo. Even the most naïve panda huggers could not sustain the belief that China would follow such “shining” examples。
If the West wants to deal rationally with China, a paradigm shift in thinking is urgently needed. And, perhaps, such a shift could provide fresh ideas on how the West can approach the world differently and even begin to solve its own problems。
To begin a reassessment, it is useful to first recognize what China is not. It is not a revolutionary power, and it is not an expansionary power. It is not a revolutionary power because, unlike the West of late, it is a non-ideological actor on the world stage and not interested in exporting its values and ways to the outside world. Even as its interests expand far beyond its borders – and make no mistake, these interests will be vigorously defended – it will not seek to actively change the internal dynamics of other countries. It is not an expansionary power because that is not part of the Chinese DNA. Compared with the many empires in human history, even at the zenith of its own power during its long civilization, China has seldom invaded other countries in large scale. The Chinese outlook is that of centrality, not universality. More practically, the Chinese see, rather wisely, that, although it could not accept wholesale the current global architecture, its rise must be peaceful. Otherwise the consequences are unimaginable. China’s sheer size makes this so. Self interests will dictate that China is likely to err on the side of restraint as it reemerges as a great power。
History is littered with precedents of failures to accommodate rising powers leading to tragic conflicts. But that does not have to be destiny. Give China time, allow it the space and independence to continue on its own path. Live and let live. The forced convergence led by the West is costing everyone, not least the West itself. Perhaps a healthy respect for divergence could pave the way toward a convergence of a more peaceful and sustainable kind。
